Two Visions of Justice: Martin Luther King, Jr. and Barack Obama - ABC Religion & Ethics (2025)

Obama concludes that policies to help all in need - which would, in theory, disproportionately aid racial minorities - should be favoured in the current context. He believes universal policies will more likely garner multiracial support, including white support. Like King, Obama is convinced that we cannot establish a just society without interracial cooperation. Thus, we must chart a course to bridge the racial divide and foster racial conciliation.

But there are further obstacles to the realization of this vision, and Obama is keenly aware of them. In his "A More Perfect Union" address, delivered in Philadelphia ten years ago, he explained that as a result of our history of racism and the pain it has caused, many blacks remain angry - at times, bitter. Though sometimes justified, anger can be counterproductive. Not only can it blind blacks to their responsibility to improve their own condition, but it can prevent the formation of interracial alliances essential for real social change.

Obama noted that some working- and middle-class whites are angry, too. They do not believe they are privileged by their race; they believe they have earned everything they have. They were not the ones who committed the injustices against blacks and thus feel no obligation to correct historical wrongs. Besides, they face serious economic challenges of their own, challenges that threaten their hopes and dreams. They resent when desegregation efforts mean their children are bused to schools outside their neighbourhoods; when affirmative action allows racial minorities to gain advantages in employment and education; and when they are accused of racism for expressing fears about black crime.

As with black anger, Obama insists that white resentment toward racial minorities is often counterproductive. It distracts, he said, from the "real culprits" behind the economic insecurity that all working- and middle-class people experience: namely, a corporate culture of greed, a government that answers to corporate interests but is unresponsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, and economic policies that favour the wealthy.

At times, Obama seems committed to an underlying social theory that considers it counterproductive to challenge whites directly for clinging to racist ideologies. These ideologies, so the theory goes, are ultimately rooted in a widespread sense of economic insecurity and political powerlessness among whites. It is better to attack the roots of the problem - corporate dominance over our lives and our democracy - without condemning whites for harbouring racist attitudes and accepting racial stereotypes.

If, through interracial cooperation and collective resolve, we fix these underlying problems, then this kind of racism should, more or less, take care of itself. In the meantime, we shore up enforcement of non-discrimination laws so that blacks and Latinos are protected from the most serious consequences of white racism.

Obama thinks we can, or at least should, set aside old racial divisions and work together to achieve common goals. For blacks, such cooperation is not possible without equal citizenship and just treatment in all dimensions of American life. But blacks should not insist that their particular grievances be addressed independently of measures designed to ensure justice and opportunity for all. There are non-blacks, including whites, who also need government to protect them and provide economic opportunity. He calls on the white community to acknowledge that black disadvantage is caused in part by discrimination, past and present.

Nonetheless, he thinks we should address these inequities not through race-specific policies but through enforcement of non-discrimination laws and universal policies that create more opportunity for all.

The famous Philadelphia speech on race ends with an anecdote about two campaign workers, one white and one black, a story Obama says he first told on King's birthday at Ebenezer Baptist Church, where both King and his father had served as pastor. The lessons we are to take from the story are, I believe, these:

• whites who lack economic security should not blame blacks and Latinos but, rather, should seek them out as allies against the injustices caused by corporate greed, corrupt political leadership, and the super-wealthy who want to keep all benefits of economic growth for themselves and their progeny;
• blacks and Latinos, in turn, should not allow their racial grievances and sense of victimhood to prevent them from forming productive alliances with whites who have similar problems.

Must We Accommodate White Resentment?

Obama's fundamental goals of racial equality and integration are worthy. Moreover, his assessment of current racial realities and their historical roots is, I believe, accurate. However, I am troubled by his proposed way forward. I see four related problems, each of which stems from Obama's failure to heed King's precept: to use means as pure as our ends.

First, Obama asks blacks to shoulder too much of the burden of racial conciliation and demands too little of whites. Indeed, in the name of interracial unity, his approach would actually reward white resistance to racial-justice measures.

Second, Obama's vision would require that we use morally suspect tactics, including compromising with, and remaining silent in the face of, injustice and racial prejudice.

Third, setting aside their questionable moral standing, the means Obama advocates are not aligned with his stated ends of racial equality and interracial fraternity, appearances notwithstanding.

Finally, his strategy, though perhaps it would secure some intermediate and worthwhile goals, might inhibit our ability to reach the ultimate objectives of racial justice and interracial comity.

Obama consistently stated that both current discrimination and the legacy of past discrimination help explain existing racial inequalities and black disadvantage, and he believes these injustices have not been adequately addressed. If this interpretation is correct, then blacks' sense of grievance - their continuing anger - is warranted. Of course, when this anger becomes rage and thus leads to cathartic violence or irrational hatred of all whites, which it sometimes has, it is not just counterproductive but abhorrent.

It is not hard to see why whites would be put off by such anger, especially those with a demonstrated commitment to racial justice. But when properly targeted and proportionate to the wrong that has elicited it, anger can be politically constructive and a healthy sign of self-respect. It can open one's eyes to similar injustices suffered by others; it can inspire one to take action; and, when understood to be widely shared, it can lead to collective mobilization.

Indeed, a lack of anger among persons unfairly treated and burdened by injustice would be disquieting, suggesting that the afflicted had either given up hope or lacked self-respect, that they had succumbed to cynicism or surrendered to injustice, and that they had ceased to put up a fight. Justified indignation should not alienate whites. And if whites respond to this kind of anger with resentment toward racial minorities, dismissing their just claims for redress as a desire for handouts or excuses for their own failings, then the darker races should be angry about this reaction, too, and deeply suspicious.

I suspect that some of the opposition to racial justice measures runs deeper than the desire of economically vulnerable whites not to lose further ground in an economy that no longer satisfactorily rewards their hard work. It also springs from their desire to keep racial minorities in a subordinate or disadvantaged position in relation to whites as a group.

Though they are reluctant to admit it publicly (and maybe even to themselves), some whites seem determined to hold on to their comparative advantages; they view policies that promote the cause of racial justice as threats to white dominance. On grounds of self-respect, blacks should not seek a political solution to the problem of racial inequality that compromises with or yields ground to this sentiment. This attitude must not be accommodated, worked around, or ignored.

In both "A More Perfect Union" and The Audacity of Hope, Obama rightly pointed out that Republican politicians and right-wing demagogues have long exploited white anger over welfare and affirmative action and white fear of black crime. Where he falters is in failing to hold accountable working-class whites who scapegoat blacks and Latinos for problems caused by corporate and political elites. He might believe such scapegoating is racist; calling it racist, however, might seem unwise or divisive.

Perhaps he was simply counselling disadvantaged racial minorities to swallow their anger, bite their tongues, and console themselves with the thought that economic causes underlie resentment toward non-whites. Perhaps he simply wanted racial minorities to recognize what they share with low- to moderate-income whites: a common interest in altering these damaging economic forces.

However, it is unreasonable and impractical to expect racial minorities simply to overlook or excuse such racist attitudes. How can they regard reactionary whites as allies if these whites will not confront their own racism? How can people of colour work together with whites who believe that blacks and Latinos have caused the economic problems that the white working class faces? Whites who scapegoat darker peoples do not yet see who the common enemy is; therefore, they cannot be relied on as allies in the fight against that enemy.

In this way, Obama's compromise with white racial resentment cannot achieve his stated aim of interracial unity.

The Cost of Justice

But let us suppose that this kind of racism is a minor problem, one that can be adequately contained with vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws. The real problem, Obama might argue, is that many whites believe that policies aimed at correcting racial injustices are contrary to their economic self-interest. They harbour no ill will toward racial minorities; nor are they attracted to white nationalist ideas. They simply do not want to pay the costs associated with fighting or correcting racial injustice.

As King emphasized, we cannot possibly realize our ultimate ideals if we allow this stance to reign unchallenged. We all must accept that justice, including the correction of injustice, comes at a cost - though one well worth paying. Any effort to respond effectively to racial injustice will inevitably cost whites something. Indeed, it will cost many racial minorities as well.

For example, given residential segregation patterns, there is no way to abolish de facto segregated schools without either integrating neighbourhoods or busing some students to schools outside their neighbourhoods. Why should all the kids who are bused be racial minorities? Though it would mean abandoning King's ethical ideal of integration, we could try to improve urban public schools without regard to their racial makeup, but that would take a lot of resources, which means higher taxes, including higher taxes for whites.

Many whites dislike affirmative action policies because such measures offend their sense of fairness. But if we abandon that set of policies (which some states already have), then any serious effort to deal with black educational and employment disadvantages will require us to devote more resources to the task, which again means higher taxes, including higher taxes for whites.

These costs cannot be escaped - at least not if we intend to take racial justice seriously. One response, not without merit, is to insist that the wealthy should bear these financial burdens; those who are themselves struggling economically should not. This tactic would mean collectively pushing for a more progressive tax scheme and higher estate taxes. But many middle-class and working-class whites do not favour this approach either; presumably, they doubt they would benefit from such efforts - though some might say it has more to do with their legitimate opposition to "big government."

Obama's response to this political reality is to combat the legacy of racial injustice by advocating universal measures that aim to help the members of all racial groups, including whites. The idea is that if whites will benefit, and the policies are not explicitly tailored to aid or appease "angry" racial minorities, we can gain greater support for progressive goals.

But even with backing from a number of whites, this strategy would intentionally obscure the morally important difference between creating more opportunity for all and remedying the effects of past racial injustices. From a moral point of view, these are not the same goals, even though they are compatible and might both be furthered by the same policy.

Obama advocated universal policies that he believes would, as a by-product, reduce glaring racial disparities. But he purposefully refrained from construing these policies as racial redress. Therefore, whites are not required to concede the legitimacy of blacks' grievances. To establish genuine racial conciliation, though, whites must willingly support policies that reduce racial inequality because doing so is what racial justice demands.

Some would reply that if universal policies will reduce racial disparities and improve the lives of minorities, there is no good reason to insist that race-specific policies be used instead. But the question is not which policies will most effectively reduce racial inequality; rather, it is why race-targeted policies are off the table.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with policies designed to help specific groups of people rather than everyone. From the standpoint of justice, we should not have to conceal the intent behind the implementation of such policies. Sometimes specific classes of persons (women, disabled persons, immigrants, rural residents, victims of natural disasters and so on) have needs that require specially tailored remedies.

Indeed, so-called universal policies are not really universal since they are not meant to help everyone, just those who have been socio-economically disadvantaged by recent government action and changes in the structure of the economy. It is at least possible that the black urban poor is another group in need of special intervention. Again, it seems that the only reason to pre-emptively rule out such remedies is that they would arouse the unjustified hostility of many whites.

Nor is the issue whether specific policies should be unmistakably labelled "for poor black people" or "to reduce racial disparities." Policies designed to help all those who are unfairly disadvantaged, regardless of race, are also justified and, given the overlapping interests involved, no doubt easier to enact.

In our determination to heal black wounds, we must not ignore the fact that others are suffering, too. As King reminds us:

"As we [black people] work to get rid of the economic strangulation that we face as a result of poverty, we must not overlook the fact that millions of Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, Indians and Appalachian whites are also poverty-stricken. Any serious war against poverty must of necessity include them."

Rather, the issue is whether we can openly defend a policy on the grounds that it is, at least in part, a response to racial injustice and still garner wide support for it. If we cannot generate such support, especially among whites, what does such an outcome say about the state of race relations and the possibility for further racial progress in this society?

If we have good reason to suspect that a significant number of whites seek to hold on to their advantages - despite the fact that some of these have been gained because of a history of racial injustice - or, worse, that a significant number of whites want to keep racial minorities trapped in an inferior social position, then people of colour have reason to resent this lack of support and to withhold solidarity from those who would deny them what they are due.

Moreover, we should not have to pay off - in essence, to bribe - the white majority in order to secure justice for racial minorities. Already, many whites refuse to accept the costs associated with achieving racial justice. Now, in order to reduce racial inequalities caused by nearly four centuries of injustice, we must adopt only those measures that provide whites with material benefits? The moral perversity of this approach should be readily apparent.

Blacks ought to demand that their fellow citizens not only acknowledge that black disadvantages are caused, at least in part, by past and ongoing injustices - a position that Obama himself has articulated - but they should also continue to insist that their fellow citizens demonstrate a commitment to remedying these disadvantages, even if the necessary remedies do not benefit these citizens directly. This admittedly difficult route is the only path to true racial conciliation. There is no bypass.

The Compromise with Injustice

If, despite his lofty rhetoric, Obama's vision was less about achieving racial justice and interracial fraternity than simply making disadvantaged racial minorities somewhat better-off materially - using whatever means, morally tainted or not, that are available. His vision has obvious merit. It offered a pragmatic strategy for navigating hazardous racial waters in a way that could improve the socio-economic circumstances of disadvantaged racial groups. If this political manoeuvre was successful, numerous people, including many members of racial minority groups, would have received much-needed help.

However, if Obama's racial philosophy is to be understood as an updated version of King's vision - a recalibration to fit the racial realities of our time - then it leaves much to be desired. Judged alongside King's transformative vision of racial equality and integration, Obama's philosophy is morally deficient and uninspiring. Relying as it does on dissimulation and subtle bribes, it does not keep faith with King's precept: to use means as pure as our ends.

Obama's vision would ask racial minorities to give up on true racial equality and to form bonds of solidarity with whites who refuse to recognize blacks' legitimate demands for redress. It failed to insist that whites carry their fair share of the burden to end racial inequality. And it tried, futilely, to build interracial fraternity on the basis of overlapping material interests rather than on a shared commitment to justice.

Perhaps we never should have looked to Barack Obama to be a moral leader on issues of race. After all, he was a black elected official who largely depended on other elected officials to enact domestic policy. He was therefore constrained by a recalcitrant Republican Party and racially divided populace.

It is no doubt difficult to insist that one's fellow citizens rise above their unjustified anger, prejudices and selfishness if, to get their votes and campaign donations, one must remain silent in the face of, or even reward, these very attitudes. That Obama did not openly defend the need to reduce racial inequality and ghetto poverty on grounds of justice, but instead relied on stealth methods and "universal" policies is revealing. It shows that he felt he must accommodate race-based hostility and illegitimate white group interests to make modest improvements in the lives of disadvantaged racial minorities.

Regrettable and distasteful as it is, perhaps this is the price that must be paid to protect the weak and vulnerable from grave harm. But such actions should be seen for what they are: moral compromises necessitated by the imperative to meet urgent needs. They should not be cast or interpreted as rectifications of racial wrongs or stepping-stones to interracial fraternity. And they certainly should not be understood as the realization of King's majestic vision of justice and peace.

Tommie Shelby is Caldwell Titcomb Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard University. He is the co-editor (with Brandon M. Terry) of To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr. An earlier version of this article was originally published in Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (Winter 2011, volume 140, number 1).